Z:gnu-www-ja-eldred-amicus--994f83-Nor has the Court of Appeals'/en

Nor has the Court of Appeals' position any support in the holdings of this Court. On the contrary, as this Court's cases make clear, copyright and related statutory monopolies in expression must conform like any other regulation of speech to the requirements of the First Amendment. In Harper &amp; Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), this Court rejected what it characterized as &ldquo;a public figure exception to copyright,&rdquo; because it found sufficient &ldquo;the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between &hellip; facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use.&rdquo; Id., at 560. Thus, the Court said, it found &ldquo;no warrant&rdquo; for a further expansion of the doctrine of fair use. Id. This by no means implies, as the Court of Appeals somehow concluded, that Harper &amp; Row stands as an &ldquo;insuperable&rdquo; bar to all First Amendment challenges to all subsequent copyright statutes. See 239 F.3d, at 375. In San Francisco Arts &amp; Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987), this Court applied standard First Amendment analysis to a statute conveying special quasi-trademark protection to the word &ldquo;Olympic,&rdquo; asking &ldquo;whether the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are greater than necessary to further a substantial government interest.&rdquo; Id., at 537 (citation omitted).