Z:gnu-www-ja-eldred-amicus--d406de-The First Amendment abhors the/en

The First Amendment abhors the vacuum of limited expression. The making of new works by the criticism, imitation, revision, and rearrangement of existing material is the hallmark of literate culture in all the arts and sciences. The First Amendment establishes not merely a series of independent doctrines, but a &ldquo;system of free expression.&rdquo; See Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (1970). Our constitutional commitments to an &ldquo;uninhibited, robust, and wide-open&rdquo; public debate, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), a &ldquo;marketplace of ideas,&rdquo; Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997); cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919), where there shall be no power to &ldquo;prescribe what shall be orthodox&rdquo; West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), require us to view with great skepticism all restrictions on the formation and expression of ideas. Laws tending to establish monopolies in the expression of ideas must pass the exacting scrutiny that protects our most fundamental freedoms. The Copyright Clause does not exempt the legislation enacted under it from such scrutiny, but rather establishes principles that enable statutory monopolies and freedom of expression to coexist. Of these, the principle of limitation in time is far from the least important. By refusing to consider the effect of the instant legislation in the broader context of a Congressional policy of piecemeal, indefinite, wholesale extension of copyrights, and in relation to the purposes established by the Copyright Clause itself, the Court of Appeals failed in its duty to protect the invaluable interests of the system of free expression.